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Abstract
In order to increase efficiency in the provision of power distribution networks, the Ger-
man regulator Bundesnetzagentur plans to implement revenue cap regulation together
with yardstick competition.
Revenue cap regulation could bear the ratchet effect: cost minimization need not to be
optimal for the operator who anticipates that his revenue cap will become adjusted ac-
cording to his cost performance. The regulator could extract all the rent by lowering an
operator’s revenue cap to the level of costs he revealed to be possible for him to reach.
The ratchet effect could be mitigated by yardstick competition at which the level of rev-
enues that is allowed to one operator is tied to the performance of others that are compa-
rable to him. One will only be allowed to accumulate revenues that recover the least cost
level that has been adopted within the group of comparable decision makers.
In a setting of two sequential regulatory lags, this paper examines the occurence of the
ratchet effect and the mitigating influence that yardstick competition has on it.
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1 Introduction
Networks are essential facilities for the distribution of electricity and constitute natural
monopolies that are not contestable. In a liberalised market, the network for power
distribution provides its services like wheeling and transformation to competitive sup-
pliers of electricity. The final user of electricity is charged a fee that pays the network
services. The demand for network services is derived from the demand of electricity
and is beyond the influence of an unbundled operator (see Bundesnetzagentur, 2005,
24 (103) as well as Bundesnetzagentur, 2006, 178 (841)). All an operator can influence
are its own costs of network provision.
The Bundesnetzagentur plans to implement regulation that gives the operators incen-
tives for efficient provision of their network. According to the plan, revenue cap reg-
ulation will be imposed on the operators. In addition to this, yardstick competition
will be established among comparable networks. The best practice among comparable
networks will set the yardstick for the performance of those that are inefficient relative
to it.
The Bundesnetzagentur assumes that the technology of power distribution features
constant returns to scale, which implies that there is a unique efficient output-input
ratio applying to all networks. This ratio is unknown by the regulator and will be
approximated by the the best practice ratio that is revealed in comparison of network
performance. An operator that has been revealed to work inefficiently relative to the
best practice will be given a revenue cap that is sufficiently below his currently incurred
costs. In order to secure the rate of return of the network, the operator has to reduce
costs until his output-input ratio is equal to that of the best practice.
An operator’s individual optimization under revenue cap regulation could bear the
ratchet effect. Although he is a residual claimant of his costs during the regulatory
lag1, cost minimization need not be optimal for him because of the regulator’s behav-
ior that is triggered by this. From each unit of cost reduction the regulator learns that
it is possible for the operator to run his network more efficient than he did before. At
the next regulatory review, he can lower the revenue cap so that it just covers the re-
vealed cost level. By this, he mandates the abidance to the revealed efficiency without
granting any rent to the operator. The operator who anticipates this rent extraction does
not minimize costs in order to hide from the regulator what his true level of minimum
necessary costs is.
1A regulatory lag is a period of time in which there is no change, especially adjustment, of the
regulatory mechanism that has been specified and announced.
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In a setting of two sequential regulatory lags, I examine the occurence of the ratchet
effect and the capability of mitigating it by yardstick competition.
The ratchet effect is discussed by Weitzman (see Weitzman, 1980) and Laffont and Ti-
role (see Laffont, Tirole, 1993, chpt 9). While Laffont and Tirole use a game-theoretic
approach by which they provide a clear intuition for the mutual behavior of the reg-
ulator and the agent, Weitzman examines the ratchet effect within the framework of
a dynamic programming problem. In his model, future demands for performance are
adjusted to observed performance by application of a mechanistic rule. I use such a
mechanistic rule to model the revenue cap adjustment at the regulatory review.
The concept of yardstick competition has been developed by Shleifer (see Shleifer,
1985).
The plan of this paper is as follows. After description of the components of the model, I
will discuss the occurence of the ratchet effect and suggest that it is plausible in reality.
Then yardstick competition will be introduced to the model. Its mitigating influence
on the ratchet effect is a result of the analysis within a decision-theoretic as well as
within a game-theoretic framework.
2 Model
From the fact that the demand for network services is beyond the influence of the
operator I conclude that it is user-fee-inelastic. By this, wheeling and provision of a
power distribution grid can be modelled as a single and onedimensional product that is
fixed in amount by the actual demand situation in the particular area. All an operator
can influence are his costs of network provision and so attention can be restricted to
incentives for cost reduction that are set by the planned regulation.
There are I network operators i = 1, . . . , n each of which is a monopolistic provider
of power wheeling in his specific region. Every i is given in lag 1 a cap Ri1 on his
revenues. This cap recovers a certain cost level, for example the one that he had in
some base period.
The individually incurred costs Ci of operator i = 1, ..., I in this base period, and with
that the revenue cap Ri1, is supposed to be higher than necessary for efficient network
provision. Historical regulation which gave the regulated firm scope for inefficiency
is one among other potential motivations for this assumption. But the regulator does
not know by how much costs are in excess. Denoting with Ci the minimum costs
3
necessary to incur for efficient provision by operator i, it follows Ri1 > C
i.2
Given his revenue cap, the operator is a residual claimant of his costs for the particular
regulatory lag t = 1, ..., T and can by choice of actual lag costs Cit , with R
i
t ≥ Cit ≥
Ci, realise some or all of his potential for profits p¯iit = R
i
t − Ci.
In the model there are no costs or disutility of cost reduction. These would diminish
the profit the operator could achieve by reducing his costs. He would not reduce his
costs at all, if the so generated yield did not recover the costs of cost reduction. The
yield depends on the length of time for which saved costs remain at the operator. For
any specification of costs of cost reduction, there can be found a duration of the reg-
ulatory lag that is sufficiently long to make sure that the operator actually gets profit
by reducing his cost level. Equivalent to the assumption of sufficient duration of the
regulatory lag is the assumption that there are no costs of cost reduction at all. Both
make sure that the operator actually wants to reduce his cost level.
In this paper, a two-lag setting will be analysed in order to simplify the exposition.
Within this setting, each lag is completely described by the operator’s revenue cap and
choice of costs. By that, a unit of cost reduction leads to the same profit in whichever
lag it occurs. This implicitly assumes that both lags have the same length because a
unit of cost reduction generates the more profit, the longer it remains at the opera-
tor. The author is aware of the fact that, because of this, the model is not capable of
analysing all possible cases of subsequent lags that are relevant in reality. Indeed, the
Bundesnetzagentur plans the first two lags to feature longer duration than the lags with
index larger than two. Thus, the impact of the planned regulation has at the transition
from lag two to lag three cannot be analysed within this model. But the model is capa-
ble of describing the impact in all other cases because they feature lags of equal length,
so it does not mean a major drawback to assume equal duration.
An operator has available only one choice per lag. By performance based adjustment
of the revenue cap, the possibility for future profit depends on the operator’s current
choice of costs. Within his single choice he has to trade-off current against future
profit. The assumption rules out that the operator reduces costs at the beginning of the
lag in order to realise profit and increases costs at the end of the lag in order to get a
high revenue cap. In reality, such behaviour can be ruled out by gearing the cap to the
average level of costs incurred during the lag.
The operator is assumed to act completely in the interest of the network owner. So the
2Note that there is no time index at the minimum costs. Because minimum costs are determined by
technology, this means that there is no technological progress over time
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specification that characterises the operator is the same as that of the general assembly
of the network share-holders.
Let u(y), with u′(y) > 0, u′′(y) < 0 be the function that assigns to every level of profit
y the utility the operator draws from this payoff, a specification that makes sure that
the solution is indeed a utility maximum. Moreover, u(·) satisfies the Inada conditions
limy→∞u′(y) = 0 and limy→0u′(y) =∞. An operator modelled in such a way prefers
balanced profit flows over time to extreme values like all in one and nothing in the other
lags. By this, he has sufficient interest in future outcomes which assures the existence
of the ratchet effect even in a two lag setting like that analysed in this paper.
Moreover, strictly concave preferences specify risk-aversion on the part of the opera-
tor, which is a deliberate assumption. It beats both alternatives of attitude towards risk.
First, risk-loving (convex utility function) can be excluded because it would imply that
an operator prefers gambling for his revenue cap to having a certain one with same
expected value. In reality, rather, reliability is argued to be an important feature of
successful regulation.
Second, risk neutrality (linear preferences) can be excluded for the following reason.
Imagine that regulation were in fact not reliable. This would mean that both, the rate of
return of the network and, due to network bankruptcy, its provision at all, are exposed
to risk. It is reasonable to assume that each individual network share-holder is a risk-
averter. If the Arrow-Lind theorem is not applicable, then the total of share-holders
acts as a risk-averter when deciding on the general assembly at which they instruct
the operator. The Arrow-Lind theorem is in fact not applicable because its constitu-
tive assumption, that all other sources of share-holders’ income are uncorrelated with
their income from the risky asset, is violated. Indeed, any shock concerning the power
distribution networks will be carried over to every sector in the economy that is depen-
dent on electricity. Thus, all possible sources of income in an industrial economy are
related to the risky situation in the electricity sector.
The performance based rule that determines the revenue cap of the next lag Rit+1 is a
function increasing in the currently incurred cost level Cit .
Rit+1 = R(R
i
t, C
i
t),
∂R
∂Cit
> 0 (1)
A simple specification of this function is the following
R(Rit, C
i
t) = (1− Ω)Cit + ΩRit (2)
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where Ω ∈ [0; 1] is a parameter governing the degree of profit extraction by the regula-
tor, allowing for continuous adjustment of the incentive power of the mechanism. By
Ω, the regulator can give rewards for cost reduction, leaving to the operator some of
the generated profits beyond the adjustment process of the revenue cap at the regula-
tory review. Rule (2) covers a wide range of possible regulatory policies, for example
the one that is planned by the Bundesnetzagentur. There, an extra rent accrues to the
most efficient operator by the specific way the comparison of efficiency is designed
(see Bundesnetzagentur, 2006, (342)).
2.1 Ratchet Effect
This section restricts attention to the analysis of an individual operator’s behaviour,
when he is faced with revenue cap regulation. Not until it is shown that the occurence
of the ratchet effect is plausible, there is reason to analyse the impact of yardstick
competition.
Within the setting of two subsequent lags of equal duration, the operator maximizes his
intertemporal utility by choice of his incurred cost level, given the adjustment rule of
the revenue cap in (2). Whatever the choice in lag one, the operator chooses Ci2 = C
i
because of the positive marginal utility of profit. The present value of utility is then
u(Ri1 − Ci1) + δu
(
(1− Ω)Ci1 + ΩRi1 − Ci
)
(3)
where δ is the discount factor, that models the operator’s time preference. The higher
the value of δ, the more important are future profits from the operator’s point of view.
Maximizing this expression by choice of Ci1 ∈ [Ci, Ri1] leads to the following first-
order condition, which is necessary and sufficient for an unique maximum.
−u′(y1) + δ(1− Ω)u′(y2)

≥ 0 if Ci1 = Ri1
= 0 if Ci1 ∈ (Ci, Ri1)
≤ 0 if Ci1 = Ci
(4)
where
y1 = R
i
1 − Ci1 (5)
y2 = (1− Ω)Ci1 + ΩRi1 − Ci (6)
If the regulator did without extraction (Ω = 1), the operator will completely reduce his
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costs to the minimum. If, conversely, complete extraction (Ω = 0) was intended, then
the solution would be an interior one because the Inada conditions hold. Leaving some
profits beyond the review (Ω ∈ (0, 1)) leads to cost minimization if
δ ≤ u
′(Ri1 − Ci)
(1− Ω)u′(Ω(Ri1 − Ci))
(7)
is satisfied. Otherwise, Ci1 = C
i is impossible. The right hand side of (7) describes as
a function of Ω an upper bound for δ that is depicted in figure 1 for logarithmic and
square root preferences.
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Figure 1: Upper bounds of the discount factor
Given a value of δ, the inverse upper bounds show how high the value of Ω has to
be at the particular preferences, in order to induce cost minimization in the first lag.
Albeit obvious differences between the two upper bounds shown, it can be seen that
for values of δ > 0.8 the regulator had at least to do without 30% of profit extraction
if he wanted the firm to work efficiently. No cost reduction at all, Ci1 = R
i
1, is again
impossible because of the Inada conditions.
An interior solution Ci∗1 satisfies
u′(y1)
u′(y2)
= δ(1− Ω) (8)
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so that the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution of profit is equal to the marginal
rate of profit-transformation that is possible at a certain regulatory policy Ω. The spec-
ification of u(·) implies that the level of optimally incurred costs Ci∗1 is the lower, the
higher is the parameter value of Ω.
Every solution that is not cost minimization is equivalent to the occurence of the ratchet
effect. The more profit extraction (the lower the Ω), the higher the costs and so the
more pronounced the ratchet effect. Indeed, given a specified level of the discount
factor δ, high enough a reward for cost reduction (high Ω) could delete the ratchet
effect. The higher the level of δ, the higher the reward that is necessary to induce cost
minimization.
Decisions concerning the operation of a power grid have long-term implications. I
suggest that operators of a network feature high discount factors. If they did not, they
would be impatient with respect to profits. Such an attitude is not reconcilable with the
farsightedness that is necessary for the operator to exhibit within his decisions.
It is reasonable to assume that the regulator is not willing to leave an amount of profit
to the operator that is sufficient to induce cost minimization. The regulator wants to
pass the benefit of cost reduction to the consumers by reduced network fees. Leaving
profits to the operator is in conflict to this aim.
This reasoning leads to the conclusion that the ratchet effect can be expected to occur
and that, thus, there is a reason for further regulatory effort. This would also be true, a
fortiori, if the number of lags were extended, because the weight that future profits get
within the operator’s optimization problem becomes the larger, the longer future lasts.
For further discussion, it is necessary to know how the operator’s optimal choice varies
with the underlying parameters. Therefore, the implicit function theorem is applied to
the the first-order condition (4) for an interior solution. Denote by S the derivative of
this condition with respect to Ci1.
S ≡ −u′′(Ri1 − Ci∗1 )− δ(1− Ω)2u′′((1− Ω)Ci∗1 + ΩRi1 − Ci) > 0 (9)
Applying the theorem leads to the following results that are globally valid.
∂Ci1
∂Ω
= −−[δ(1− Ω)u
′′(y2)(Ri1 − Ci∗1 )− δu′(y2)]
S
< 0 (10)
∂Ci1
∂δ
= −−(1− Ω)u
′(y2)
S
> 0 (11)
∂Ci1
∂Ci
= −δ(1− Ω)u
′′(y2)
S
> 0 (12)
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(10) shows that the optimal cost level is the lower, the higher isΩ. The second line tells
that the operator chooses to incur a cost level that is higher, the higher his preference for
profits in the future. The higher the discount factor, the more intensively the operator
feels the reducing impact that low costs in the presence, and so high profits, have on his
future revenue cap. Finally, it can be seen in (12) that operators with higher minimum
costs incur higher costs C1 given a certain cap R1. Unlike in the two previous results,
this is not evidence of a more intensive ratchet effect but of limited potential for cost
reduction.
The direction of variation of optimal choice induced by variation of a particular pa-
rameter is now clear. Variations are strictly monotone because of the global validity of
result (10), (11) and (12). Further, it follows from the theorem of the maximum (see
Sundaram, 1996, 237) that the optimal cost level to incur varies continuously with the
parameters.
As long as different operators have revenue caps that are at least proportional to each
other, variations in δ and Ci are sufficient to model different characteristics of different
operators that are relevant for their individual choice of costs. Differing discount fac-
tors could result from differing dispositions of the owners of the different power grids
with respect to patience. Differing minimum costs are impossible if networks use the
same technology. But it could be that operators do not exactly know what this mini-
mum cost level is. They rather make the best guess they can given their information.
An individual operator could think that his minimum cost level is Ci = X whatever
the true level. Even if all power grids were in fact the same, the operators might differ
in their cost characteristics, albeit by mistake of appreciation.
It can be stated that there exists a continuous and strictly increasing functionG assign-
ing to each value of a parameter z ∈ Z the optimal cost level incurred in the first lag
by an operator who features exactly that value, where z could be δ or Ci.
2.2 Yardstick Competition
So far, discussion focused on the decision of a single operator that is subject to revenue
cap regulation. The occurence of the ratchet effect has been reasoned. Now, the possi-
bility of workable yardstick competition will be introduced to the model and it will be
shown that yardstick competition mitigates the ratchet effect.
Take I ≥ 2 operators which are comparable to each other. The course of regulation,
including revenue cap regulation and yardstick competition, is the following. Prior to
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the first lag, network performance is compared in order to find the best practice whose
output-input ratio is used as an approximation of the true efficient ratio3. Operators
will be forced to work at the best practice ratio by adequate cutting of their revenue
caps. Consequently, the revenue caps, respectively cost levels, are proportional across
different networks.
Thus, networks are symmetric at the beginning of the first lag. If they are still symmet-
ric at its end, depends on the individual decision each operator makes given his revenue
cap. However, at the regulatory review between the first and the second lag there will
be made a comparison again. By the same process as described above, networks will
be made symmetric prior to the second lag.
In the regulatory review between the first and the second lag, there can only be found
a best practice if network operators made different decisions with respect to their in-
curred cost level. The comparative statics established that this will be the case if the
operators feature different characteristics.
In the following, the realisation of the variable z denotes the particular characteristic δ
or Ci of an individual network operator. By the function G, mentioned in section 2.1,
a higher value of z implies a higher level of costs that is incurred in the first lag.
For both characteristics the analysis will be essentially the same, but the interpretation
of the results differ. Denote by z the least value of z that is featured among all op-
erators. It will be shown that yardstick competition induces operators with z < z to
reduce their costs by more than they would have done without yardstick competition.
This is evidence of the mitigating effect that yardstick competition has on the ratchet
effect, only if z denotes individual discount factors. If, instead, z denotes the appre-
ciations of minimum costs, then this result is evidence that yardstick competition is
an instrument to accelerate improvement of overall efficiency in network operation by
revealing the properties of the underlying technology to the ignorant operators.
Discussion will concern only two operators, 1 and 2, for whom collusive behavior is
excluded explicitly. In reality, cooperative behaviour is excluded because the number
of operators is sufficiently large to render it too expensive in terms of transaction costs.
Analysis will be done in a decision-theoretic as well as within a game-theoretic frame-
work. In both, each operator has a set of possible decisions that are available to him
and a probability distribution concerning the decision of his "‘opponent"’.
In the decision-theoretic framework, an operator does not take into account any reac-
3Note that technology is assumed to feature constant returns to scale
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tions of his opponent. This allows to work with sets of possible decisions and with
associated probability distributions that are continuous without having to deal with
sophisticated mathematical formalism. Strategic interaction between the operators,
which is relevant in reality, will be considered within the game-theoretic framework.
The price for modeling this interaction without sophisticated formalism is that only
discrete sets of possible decisions as well as discrete prior probability distributions are
possible.
At first the decision-theoretic analysis will be exerted. The decision an operator makes
when he is solely subject to revenue cap regulation4 will be denoted by the adjective
"‘isolated"’. Operator 1, whose optimal isolated choice is denoted C1∗, does not know
which value z characterises operator 2. All he has is a probability distribution F over
the parameter space Z = [zL, zH ] from which z is drawn. The density f is assumed
to be strictly positive on Z. The commonly known function G assigns to each z the
optimal choice of an individual featured by that value. Thus, the space of 2’s possible
choices is [CL, CH ]. ByG, the distribution function F carries over fromZ to [CL, CH ].
Given a pair of choices C1 and C2, operator 1 becomes relatively inefficient compared
to 2, if C2 < C1. As a result, his revenue cap will be cut in lag two. If, instead,
C2 ≥ C1 were the case, then 1 would get a revenue cap according to the rule denoted
in (2). So 1’s second lag utility is
u2 =
 u(C
2 − C1) , if C2 < C1
u((1− Ω)C1 + ΩR1 − C1) , if C2 ≥ C1
Facing this, there are two cases in which 1wishes to deviate from his isolated optimum
C1∗
1. CH < C1∗ or
2. CL < C1∗ < CH
In case 1, C1∗ would always be underbidden by C2 and 1 would choose C1 < C1∗ in
order to at least save his Ω-reward. In the second case, assume that cost minimization
remains to be suboptimal. Operator 1 tries to stay as near as possible to his isolated
optimum so that a choice C1 ≤ CL can be excluded. His problem can be considered
in the following way: Given a choice C1 ∈ (CL, CH), 1 becomes underbidden with
4this is the decision analysed in the section about the ratchet effect
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probability F (C1) by a choice C2 < C1 that has density f(C2). Because every value
C2 ∈ [CL, C1) is possible in principle, 1’s expected utility, when underbidden, is
C1∫
CL
u(C2 − C1)f(C2)dC2 (13)
His expected utility when not underbidden at his choice is, following the same reason-
ing,
CH∫
C1
u((1− Ω)C1 + ΩR1 − C1)f(C2)dC2 (14)
The overall expected utility in lag two will be denoted E[u(y2)] and takes the form
E[u(y2)] =
C1∫
CL
u(C2 − C1)f(C2)dC2
+ u((1− Ω)C1 + ΩR1 − C1)(1− F (C1)) (15)
so that the present value U(C1) of 1’s utility, given a choice C1, is finally5
U(C1) = u(R1 − C1) + δ1E[u(y2)] (16)
The rearranged first-order condition for maximization of (16) is
u′(R1 − C1∗∗) = δ1(1− Ω)u′((1− Ω)C1∗∗ + ΩR1 − C1)(1− F (C1∗∗)) (17)
+ δ1
[
f(C1∗∗)[u(C1∗∗ − C1)− u((1− Ω)C1∗∗ + ΩR1 − C1)]
]
At the optimum C1∗∗, a marginal increase in costs lowers profit and by that also utility
in lag one, see the left hand side of (17). In lag two, it has two effects that are balanced
with that of lag one. As the first term on the right hand side of (17) shows, higher costs
lead via a higher revenue cap to higher profits and thus to an increase of utility in the
case that i is not underbidden. But at the same time, a marginal increase in costs leads
to a marginal increase in the probability to become underbidden measured by f(C1∗∗).
When underbidding takes place, 1 loses the difference in utility shown in the second
bracket of the second summand in (17).
In order to compare C1∗∗ with the isolated optimum C1∗, it must be assured that the
5Note that revenue caps of different operators are proportional to each other, by the assumption of
constant returns to scale in network provision. For simplicity it will in the following be assumed that
they are identical.
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first-order condition is also sufficient for a unique utility maximum. As this is true if
U(C1) is strictly concave, it is necessary to examine its second derivative with respect
to C1. Defining for simplification of notation
y1 ≡ R1 − C1
yl2 ≡ C1 − C1
yh2 ≡ (1− Ω)C1 + ΩR1 − C1 (18)
this second derivative is
∂2U(C1)
∂2C1
= u′′(y1) (19)
+ δ1(1− Ω)
[
u′′(yh2 )(1− Ω)(1− F (C1))− u′(yh2 )f(C1)
]
(20)
+ δ1f ′(C1)[u(yl2)− u(yh2 )] (21)
+ δ1f(C1)[u′(yl2)− u′(yh2 )(1− Ω)] (22)
(19) and (20) are strictly negative because of the the strict concavity of u(·) and because
f(·) is assumed strictly positive. By the same reasoning, (22) is strictly positive if
Ω > 0, what will be assumed in the following, in order to model the plan of the
Bundesnetzagentur to establish a reward for efficiency (see Bundesnetzagentur, 2006,
80 (342)). Nothing can be said about the sign of (21) without further information on
f(·).
Thus, the second derivative is negative, if the sum of (21) and (22) is negative. That is
f ′(C1)[u(yl2)− u(yh2 )] + f(C1)[u′(yl2)− u′(yh2 )(1− Ω)] < 0 (23)
⇔
f ′(C1) >
−f(C1)[u′(yl2)− u′(yh2 )(1− Ω)]
u(yl2)− u(yh2 )
> 0 (24)
It will now be derived analytically that C1∗∗ < C1∗. The exposition is completely
technical and does not provide any economic insights. Its purpose is solely to show
how derivation works.
Assume condition (24) holds. Ignoring for a while the second summand of the right
hand side of (17) and transforming gives
u′(R1 − C1∗∗)
u′((1− Ω)C1∗∗ + ΩR1 − C1) = δ
1(1− Ω)(1− F (C1∗∗)) (25)
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Note, that (25) resembles the first-order condition for the isolated optimum which was
u′(R1 − C1∗))
u′((1− Ω)C1∗ + ΩR1 − C1) = δ
1(1− Ω) (26)
If C1∗∗ = C1∗, then (25) could not be satisfied because, for 1 − F (C) ≤ 1 and
C1∗ > CL, its right hand side is less in value than that of (26). Thus, the left hand side
of (25) must decrease by a lowering of costs C1 < C1∗, which in turn raises the right
hand side so that costs must again increase a bit in order to satisfy (25). This kind of
oscillation goes on until a cost level is reached that is lower than C1∗.
Including the second summand in (17) leads after rearranging to
u′(y1)
u′(yh2 )
= δ1(1− Ω)(1− F (C1∗∗))− δ1f(C1∗∗)u(y
h
2 )− u(yl2)
u′(yh2 )
(27)
The right hand side of (27) is even lower than in (25), so that at least the initial ampli-
tude of the oscillation mentioned above is enlarged. How the oscillation continues will
become clear, when examining the behavior of the added term, called P for simplicity,
with respect to costs.
∂P
∂C1
= δ1
u′(yh2 )[f(C
1)[u′(yh2 )(1− Ω)− u′(yl2)] + f ′(C1)[u(yh2 )− u(yl2)]]
(u′(yh2 ))2
− δ1f(C
1)[u(yh2 )− u(yl2)]u′′(yh2 )(1− Ω)
(u′(yh2 ))2
> 0 (28)
The term in squared brackets in the numerator of the first fraction in (28) is the negative
of (23) and thus strictly positive by condition (24). Because of the concavity of u(·) the
second fraction in (28) is negative and finally the whole derivative is strictly positive.
This term P , increasing in costs, enters the first-order condition with negative sign so
that the following holds true: At starting levelC1∗ there is downward pressure on costs.
If it has decreased accordingly, there arises an upward pressure which is, because of
∂P/∂C1 > 0, slightly smaller than it was when P had been ignored. Thus, costs
will increase and by that the downward pressure rises again but will not be as strong
as initially, and so on. In a nutshell, the term P enhances downward- and lessens
upward-pressure on the cost level. Finally, C1∗∗ < C1∗.
So, the decision-theoretic discussion showed that yardstick competition is capable of
mitigating the ratchet effect.
The decision-theoretic framework allowed to study the behaviour of an operator that
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does not take into account what implications his decision has on that of his opponent.
But in reality, operators might interact strategically. When optimizing, they anticipate
their opponent’s reaction to their decision.
Such strategic interaction will now be analysed. As before, there are two operators,
1 and 2, both having the same revenue caps R1. Unlike before, the range of possible
values of z is discrete and so are the individual priors of the operators. This allows the
analysis to be done with basic formalism.
1 and 2 can individually be characterised by one of two possible values of z ∈ {zL, zH}
with zL < zH . An operator will be refered to as an H-type, respectively as an L-type,
if his individual value of z is zH , respectively zL. Denote with Ck, where k = L,H ,
the isolated optimum of type k and note that CL < CH .
Let {C1, C2} be a pair of cost choices by the two players. Because of yardstick com-
petition, the revenue cap of the following lag will only recovermin{C1, C2}. If type k
can eventually remain at his isolated optimum, he gains Θ∗∗ as a pay-off. An H-Type
gets Θ∗ when choosing CL and Θ when instead choosing CH and becoming underbid-
den by the other operator. When choosing CH , type L gains Θ∗ if he is not, and Θ if
he is underbidden. By assumption Θ∗∗ > Θ∗ > Θ, so that everyone most prefers his
isolated optimum and most dislikes becoming underbidden.
The following figure shows the normal form representation of this game. Capital letters
2
1
H L
H
h l
h (Θ∗∗,Θ∗∗) (Θ,Θ∗)
l (Θ∗,Θ) (Θ∗,Θ∗)
h l
h (Θ∗∗,Θ∗) (Θ,Θ∗∗)
l (Θ∗,Θ) (Θ∗,Θ∗∗)
L
h l
h (Θ∗,Θ∗∗) (Θ,Θ∗)
l (Θ∗∗,Θ) (Θ∗∗,Θ∗)
h l
h (Θ∗,Θ∗) (Θ,Θ∗∗)
l (Θ∗∗,Θ) (Θ∗∗,Θ∗∗)
Figure 2: Normal form representation of the two person game
H,L denote types, small type letters l, h label high or low cost level as the possible
actions. The upper left matrix, for example, illustrates the game that is played between
H-types and the other matrizes do in an analogous manner.
Choosing CL is a dominant strategy of an L-type of operator. The Nash equilibrium in
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the lower right matrix game of two L-types is an equilibrium in dominant strategies.
Playing CH is thus only reasonable for anH-type. A player is typeH with probability
p and L with counterprobability 1 − p. Each individual knows his own type but not
that of the other. With respect to this, he applies the probability distribution {p, 1− p}.
Given he is typeH , operator 1 plays CH with probability x1. He does so with certainty
(x1 = 1) if the expected utility at this choice exceeds the one he would gain at CL,
where the expected utility is calculated with respect to {p, 1−p} and x2, the respective
choice of 2. Formally:
x1 = 1 ⇔ p [x2Θ∗∗ + (1− x2)Θ] + (1− p)Θ > Θ∗
⇔ x2 > Θ
∗ −Θ
p(Θ∗∗ −Θ) (29)
1’s best response correspondence is thus
x1 =

1, if x2 > Θ
∗−Θ
p(Θ∗∗−Θ)
∈ [0; 1], if x2 = Θ∗−Θp(Θ∗∗−Θ)
0, if x2 < Θ
∗−Θ
p(Θ∗∗−Θ)
The according correspondence of 2 is a mirror image to that of 1 because of the sym-
metry of the game.
Denote by xˆ the probability that the opponent plays CH , given that he is an H-type. If
this probability exceeds a critical value, then an H-type of player chooses CH . This
critical value consists of the probability p that the opponent is H at all and of the
fraction Θ
∗−Θ
Θ∗∗−Θ of maximum possible loss that can be avoided by playing C
L from the
very beginning.
The higher this fraction, the higher the threshold for xˆ beyond which an operator ex-
pects to be better off by CH . If the spread between the certain payoff Θ∗ and the risky
one Θ∗∗ is small, then an operator is hardly willing to gamble, choosing CH .
The other way round for p: the higher the probability of the opponent to be anH-type,
the lower the threshold.
Fix values for the payoffs Θ∗∗,Θ∗ and Θ and define pc ≡ Θ∗−Θ
Θ∗∗−Θ . Whenever p = p
c,
respectively p < pc, then xi = 1 with i = 1, 2, respectively xi ∈ [0, 1], cannot be the
optimal choice because xˆ as a probability can take at most value 1. In such a situation,
anH-type does not expect to gain his isolated maximum but instead to be underbidden.
He prefers to ensure Θ∗ by choice of CL.
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The game is symmetric. For all probability distributions {p, 1 − p} with p < pc,
{x1 = 0, x2 = 0} is the only Bayesian equilibrium. In this equilibrium, both choose
CL irrespective of their type.
This can be seen in figure 3 in which the reaction functions are drawn. They run
along the axes because xi(xj) = 0 is the best response of i to whatever value of xj .
The equilibrium is in the origin and highlighted by a circle. For all distributions with
 X1 
 X2 
 1 
 1 
 x2(x1)
 x1(x2)
 0 
Figure 3: Reaction functions when H-types are unlikely
p > pc, there are three equilibria, that of before {x1 = 0, x2 = 0}, one in mixed
strategies {x1 = Θ∗−Θp(Θ∗∗−Θ) , x2 = Θ
∗−Θ
p(Θ∗∗−Θ)} and finally {x1 = 1, x2 = 1}. They are
shown in the reaction correspondence graph of figure 4, again highlighted by circles.
For xˆ < xc(p) ≡ Θ∗−Θ
p(Θ∗∗−Θ) the correspondences run on the axes because then xi = 0 is
the best response. At (xˆ = xc), indifference between cost levels occurs, illustrated by
the dotted line. To every xˆ beyond that value xi = 1 is the best response.
xc(p) shifts to the origin the higher is p, enlarging the intervall of xˆ over which xi = 1
is optimal. That is the graphical illustration of the fact that an H-type is the more
willing to actually play CH , the higher is the probability that the opponent is H , too.
In figure 3, p was so low that xc(p) lied beyond the value 1.
Pair {CH , CH} occurs with probability p2x1x2, which is simply the product of the
marginal probabilities for CH . Without yardstick competition, each operator would
choose his most prefered cost level Ck, and {CH , CH} would be the result with prob-
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1
 
 
x1(x2)
 
x2(x1)
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X1 
 
xc (p )
Figure 4: Reaction functions when H-types are sufficiently likely
ability p2 ≥ p2x1x2. So, it can be stated that yardstick makes this result -least prefered
by the regulator- almost as or even less probable.
If only one operator chose CL, then, by yardstick competition, the resulting caps in lag
two would only recover CL. This would also be the case if both chose CL. Thus, the
probability for this result -most prefered by the regulator- is simply 1 − p2x1x2, the
counterprobability to result {CH , CH}. Without yardstick competition, that probabil-
ity were (1− p)2 and by that less.
With yardstick competition, the result most prefered by the regulator is more, that least
prefered at most as probable than without. So, the simple game studied implies, too,
that yardstick competition is capable of mitigating the ratchet effect.
3 Conclusion
In setting of two subsequent lags, the paper studied the occurence of the ratchet effect
and the mitigating influence that yardstick competition has on it. This is relevant be-
cause it allows to check the implications of the regulation that is planned by the Bun-
desnetzagentur to be imposed on German power distribution networks. The two-lag
setting allowed to study these implications without having to rely on any assumption
about the actual length of time of its implementation.
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The result of the model was, that the ratchet effect will occur under two reasonable as-
sumptions. First, network operators feature high preference for future profits. Second,
the regulator wants to extract almost all of the operator’s rent.
Moreover, by a decision- and a game-theoretic examination, it was shown to be true
that the ratchet effect can be mitigated by applying yardstick competition if network
operators feature different characteristics, that are relevant for their choice of costs.
An operator will reduce his costs as a precaution when he is faced with the threat of
becoming underbidden by the cost choice of another one, resulting in an unwanted cut
of his revenue cap.
The whole reasoning relied on the assumptions of network-fee inelastic demand for
wheeling and constant returns to scale in network provision.
By the first assumption, all an operator can influence is the level of costs that he incurs
for the provision of his network. Because of this, increasing an operator’s efficiency is
equivalent to reduction of his costs, so that it was possible to restrict attention to cost
reduction. The latter assumption is empirically borne (see Bundesnetzagentur, 2006,
178(847)) and, thus, lacks direct theoretical justification. If it failed, revenue caps of
different networks could never be made at least proportional to each other before the
beginning of a lag. Consequently, the comparative statics result would not be sufficient
to describe different characteristics of network operators because comparative statics
are done "‘ceteris paribus"’.
Further interesting work could be to examine the ratchet effect in cases that feature
different duration of subsequent lags. I suppose that the result will depend crucially on
the concrete specification of preferences.
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